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On November 21, Kabul witnessed once again a major terrorist incident 
against a place of worship of a religious minority in the country. A suicide 
bomber attacked the Baqir-ul-uloom mosque from the inside by blowing 
himself up among the other worshippers belonging to the religious Shia 
community. The Shias constitute an estimated 15 per cent of Afghanistan’s 
population of about 30 million. The timing was strategically chosen since 
the Shias were celebrating the end of the important Arbaeen period, a 40-
day mourning period to commemorate the death of Imam Hussein, the 
Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and a Shia martyr. This occasion is one of 
the most important events in the Shia religious calendar. Like in several 
other attacks against Shia’s in Afghanistan this year, the Islamic State (IS) 
has claimed responsibility for the recent incident in which more than 30 
people got killed and over 80 people were injured. This on-going series of 
anti-Shia attacks by the Taliban is rising several questions: What is the 
rationale of the IS to attack the Shia community in Afghanistan? What is 
the role of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours in the increasing level of 
terrorist attacks in the country? Against this backdrop, how is the 
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government in Kabul as well as the international community reacting to the increasing 
attacks against Afghanistan’s religious minorities? 	
In order to contextualise the latest IS attacks against the Shias in Afghanistan, one must take 
into account several geographical- and actor-orientated conflict constellations, as well as 
domestic and international dimensions.  
Firstly, there is the IS-Taliban confrontation. During the last years - especially in the post 
2001 ‘Kunduz offensive’ by the Taliban - one could observe a tremendous strengthening of 
the military capacities of the Taliban forces. In this context, one phenomenon is remarkable. 
Even if the Taliban were not able to hold Kunduz for a long time, the 2015 battle over this 
city, which is the sixth greatest urban centre in Afghanistan, has a highly symbolic nature. 
At the very core of the symbolism of Kunduz lies the semblance of a tectonic shift in the 
Taliban’s self-conception and especially self-portrayal: from a mainly exclusive movement 
towards an inclusive one. In other words, the Taliban is undertaking attempts to broaden its 
ethnic-cultural recruiting base. It seems that the Taliban is trying to learn a lesson from the 
past and attempt to broaden its social structure and base by softening its stand towards 
Afghanistan’s’ non-Pashtun population and non-Afghan migrants. As such, the ‘battle over 
Kunduz’ symbolises a change in the overall political strategy and subsequently the 
recruitment patterns of the Taliban: from a mainly Pashtun-focused composition of its ranks 
and files towards a more ‘multi-ethnic force’ in order to improve their chances of 
maintaining rule over seizures of territory, especially in the north of Afghanistan which has 
been the stronghold of anti-Taliban forces. This could determine a remarkable departure 
from the repressive policies against minorities during the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan (1996-2001), in which Shia had no opportunity to worship in public 
at all. 	
Moreover, IS is most likely identifying the country’s Shia as a target for two reasons: on 
one hand, from a radicalized Sunni Jihadist perspective, Shias are a priori identified as a 
hostile religious community since they  “are conspiring to destroy Islam and to resuscitate 
Persian imperial rule over the Middle East and ultimately the world”. On the other side, IS 
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seems to be convinced that certain sections of Shias might function as a potential recruiting 
base of the rival Taliban movement. 	
Secondly, the latest attack must be seen in the context of the current attempts of the 
National Unity Government (NUG) to negotiate with minorities -especially Shia- aiming at 
improving their political and economic situation, at least on paper. Shia communities, 
especially the Hazaras, where organizing large scale protests against the NUG demanding 
more political participation and representation as well as a greater share in the economic 
development of the country. As such, the IS attack on the Shia can be seen as undermining 
the efforts to strengthen national unity and civil society activities in general as well as, 
aimed at avoiding greater participation of minorities in Afghanistan’s political-
administrative structure and social, economic life in particular. 	
In this context, the IS attack was also an attempt to weaken the current NUG government 
(which suffers already from internal fractures and rifts) by portraying them as unable to 
ensure a safe environment for the various religious (non-Sunni) minorities. Consequently, 
much critic was raised that the government is not doing enough to protect the Shia 
community against IS and other Jihadist groups. 	
Thirdly, the IS attacks against the Shia could also be seen as a strategy to get Iran to be 
more involved in Afghanistan. Tehran has a traditional long record of interfering massively 
in the domestic affairs of its neighbouring states, f. ex. by supporting pro-Shia militant 
insurgency and terror groups (like encouraging and paying Hezbollah forces, Afghan and 
Iraqi mercenaries to in support of Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria). Iran could use the latest 
attack against Shias in Afghanistan as a justification to be more active in Afghanistan. This 
would lead without doubt to a further weakening of the government in Kabul and to more 
destabilisation in the country. Furthermore, the IS attacks is also a clear warning for the 
Shia community not to cooperate with the Taliban nor with the NUG; instead they should 
keep a low profile in Afghanistan. Moreover, Iran’s involvement is gaining significance, 
since it is massively recruiting fighters among Afghanistan’s Shias to take part in the war in 
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Syria. Deploying around 20,000 fighters from Afghanistan, Iran’s ‘Foreign Legion’, 
depends heavily on Afghan’s Shia fighters. Some sources are claiming that around 20,000 
Afghan Shias are permanently fighting in Syria. As such there are several common interests 
between Sunni IS and Shia Tehran beyond the old Sunni-Shia divide. Both are combating 
the pro-democratic forces in Syria by all means, as such they are not interested in an uplift 
of the social, economic and political conditions of the Shia community in Afghanistan. Nor 
any peace and reconciliation processes between the Taliban and NUG is in the interest of 
Iran or IS. In this context it is worth mentioning that IS in Pakistan is following similar 
strategies. Instead of targeting directly state government institutions, they are focusing 
primarily on traditional religious sites and places known to be strongholds of criticism and 
resistance against the central civilian and military authorities. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that IS fighters from Syria are infiltrating Afghanistan via Pakistan and that recent 
major terror assaults against international institutions are planned in Pakistan, like the a 
bomb attack on the German consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif.	
Being aware of these intermingling domestic and international factors, one must ask how 
the government in Kabul and the international community are willing to handle the situation 
of the IS threat and the role of Afghanistan’s neighbours, foremost Pakistan and Iran, in 
orchestrating the terrorist scenarios in the region. Here, one must clearly differentiate 
between the Afghan government and the international community. Kabul is very much 
aware about the IS threat and its connections with Pakistan but given its limited resources 
and multiple challenges, the Afghan security forces have not much capabilities  to fight IS 
alone. The US decision, to entrust their on-going military mission in Afghanistan with a 
more robust (offensive) mandate has proved already to be an effective measure. 
Furthermore, the earlier statement of President-elect Trump to have a stronger focus on 
Pakistan when it comes to counter terrorism affecting the whole region would be without a 
doubt a step in the right direction. By having said this, the international community must 
finally realise how is the situation and be willing to deal with the consequences and also 
with the root causes of the terrorism in the AfPak region and beyond. More concretely, it 
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must deal with the challenge of state-sponsored terrorism (this includes diplomatic support), 
and especially with Iran and Pakistan. Consequently, there must be a clear condemnation of 
support for cross-border terrorism by states. The international community should hold 
accountable the States, which are still identifying terrorism as an instrument of their foreign 
policy. 	
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